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Images of Truth: 
From Sign to Symbol 
By Carlo Sini. 
Translated by Massimo Verdicchio. 
Edited by Hugh J. Silverman 
and Graeme Nicholson . 
Contemporary Studies in Philosophy, 
and the Human Sciences, Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1993. 
With this translation of Carlo 
Sini's Immagini di verita (1985)-ably 
rendered by Massimp Verdicchio 
(University of Alberta), and provided 
with an introduction, footnotes, bibli-
ography and index-not only for the 
first time does a text by this impor-
tant Italian philosopher become 
available to English-speaking read-
ers, but also, an original attempt to 
think through and beyond the fate of 
metaphysics and its distinctive ques-
tioning of truth is brought before a 
wider public. "Born out of the living 
experience of courses taught at the 
University of Milan" and deliberately 
retaining the "presentational style of 
the original lectures," Immagini diver-
ita narrates an inevitable "stage" in 
Sini's ongoing philosophical "jour-
ney" involved with "questioning 
interpretation and the sign" (xxvii), 
inevitable since the meaning of inter-
pretation and the sign belongs 
together with that of truth. 
Ostensibly, then, philosophers 
ought to have common cause with 
the intent of this text, as "the philoso-
pher is first of all the friend of truth" 
(xxviii). The thesis of this text, if one 
may speak in such terms, is that 
"truth may lie in the thorough think-
ing of nihilism .. . of what in 
nihilism, as Heidegger would say, 
'makes us think' " (xxviii). The hesi-
tation in talking about the thesis in 
this way derives from the thesis itself. 
"When interpretation takes on the 
form, as in this case, of 'infinite semi-
osis' " (xxviii), such that "what 
occurs in the interpretation is not the 
absolute truth" (137), then any singu-
lar statement of a thesis cannot be cir-
culated free and clear. Yet it is pre-
cisely in the recognition of this 
interpretive liability-"that where the 
question of truth is concerned we are 
all debtors" (xxviii)-that the crucial 
truth of Sini' s own interpretation lies. 
To the metaphysical ideal of "well-
rounded truth" inscribed in the per-
fect identity of thinking and being, 
Sini / juxtaposes the thesis that "the 
world 'contains infinite interpreta-
tions' [Nietzsche]." Yet merely to 
affirm this thesis against metaphysics 
is to remain in nihilism and thus to 
"say 'no' to what metaphysics has for 
centuries said or tried to say 'yes' to, 
but ... on the same premises" (80). 
Hence it is to affirm a "no" that "is 
equivalent to the metaphysical 'yes' it 
wants to destroy" (110). To assert 
with absolute authority that in the 
matter of truth there is no absolute 
authority is not then so much self-
contradictory as nonsensical. "On the 
strength of its logic, conceived as the 
only possible one," nihilism is an 
answer to the metaphysical question 
"What is truth?" that robs the ques-
tion itself of its very sense. Moreover, 
"nihilism contradicts common expe-
rience and the very structure of expe-
rience" (80) by leaving in the dark the 
enigma that there is for us an 'object'. 
Sini' s task is to provide "an assess-
ment of the images of truth that have 
. . . characterized and founded our 
378 DIFFERENT/A 
overall history ... to show the rea-
sons behind this history and to 
explain eventually what new image 
of truth supports it" (xxviii-xxix). The 
first part of the book examines truth's 
images in the thinking of selected 
"great authors" ( especially 
Parmenides, Aristotle, Hegel, and 
Heidegger) in order to show by these 
examples that the founding presup-
position that constitutes the sense of 
metaphysics-the absolute identity of 
thinking and being-contains in all 
its "images" its own "catastrophe" 
(lit. kata-strophe "over-turning"). In 
our own age, this holds both of the 
nihilistic pursuit of unlimited knowl-
edge and power and the 'thinking of 
being' that is meant to point beyond 
this fate and to leave metaphysics to 
itself. Yet such thinking "continues to 
wander around and within the 'pub-
lic places' (truth, error, being, noth-
ing) instituted by the public logos of 
metaphysics", without "eyes for the 
non-metaphysical [ and the non-pub-
lic] 'sense' of experience" (144-45). 
Sini' s own quest for a "new image" is 
thus not meant to shore up the fated 
metaphysical project in a new way, 
but to renew non-metaphysically the 
philosophical commitment to the 
sense of experience and to knowing 
what we are doing and why. In place 
of the "metaphysical will to dominate 
experience totally and to 'resolve it' 
completely in 'public' truths that are 
functionally effective and symbolical-
ly senseless" (153), Sini ventures to 
discover the original constitutive 
"finiteness of experience", precisely 
not as its imperfection but as its 
"enchantment", that is, its original 
symbolic character as "finite and per-
fect part" that "lacks nothing" (123-
24). In this discovery may now lie the 
origin, justification and destiny of 
philosophy. 
ROBERT BURCH 
University of Alberta 
Critics dell' oggetti-
vazione e ragione stori-
es: Saggio su 
P. Yorck von Wartenburg 
By Francesco Donadio. 
Napoli: Edizione Guida, 1992. 
For most philosophers, with the 
exception of the reader of 
Heidegger's Being and Time, the fig-
ure of Count Paul Yorck von 
Wartenburg (1835-1897) remains little 
known. In section 77 of Being and 
Time, Heidegger uses some of Yorck's 
more profound speculative theses 
concerning the concept of historicity. 
Heidegger constructs, as we know, 
his reading of Yorck, utilizing some 
significant texts from the 
Briefwechseln between Yorck and 
Wilhelm Dilthey, and Heidegger 
demonstrates as the programmatic 
task of a research on historicity, that 
the study of Dilthey's own work 
must be undertaken "in the spirit" of 
Count Yorck. 
One could single out in this sec-
ond half of the 1920s the corning out 
of anonymity of Yorck and together 
with this the official and authorita-
tive recognition of his philosophical 
depth. In fact, within the panorama 
of traditional academic philosophy, 
Count Yorck presents himself as an 
outsider: jurisconsult and member of 
the Prussian senate, administrator of 
